Southend United beat Aldershot Town 4-1- at Roots Hall on Saturday afternoon.
Second-half goals from Harry Cardwell, Ollie Kensdale, Jack Wood and Marcus Dackers came after Aldershot had taken a first-half lead through Josh Stokes.
In this article, I will break down some key tactical talking points from the match, including how Aldershot were so dangerous in the first-half, and why Jack Wood’s introduction after half-time allowed Southend to control the match better.
First-half
Prior to the match, I identified that Aldershot are particularly dangerous during offensive transitions after turning possession over. It therefore made sense that the most likely way for us to get a result was to keep the ball well, pin Aldershot back for prolonged spells, exert control on the match, and take our chances when they came. If we didn’t control the game well, and were involved in an end-to-end match with lots of chances for both sides, we would be playing into Aldershot’s hands.
The initial team selection (to include James Morton from the start) therefore made perfect sense. The one place in the XI that was most up for grabs was in central midfield, where we had to choose between Wes Fonguck and Morton. Fonguck’s inclusion would have given us better threat in the final-third due to his off-the-ball movement, where he can create space for our left wing-back Jack Bridge to cut into, onto his stronger right-foot. However, we wouldn’t have been able to play as high a volume of passes compared to if Morton were selected, because Morton offers a better first and second-phase presence during our build-up.
This arguably worked fairly well in the first-half, where we had a 68.18% possession share and accumulated an expected goals (xG) figure of 1.09. However, there were a number of moments where we allowed possession to be turned over far too easily. Consequently, Aldershot could break forwards at pace, and create chances for themselves. Aldershot accumulated an xG of 1.69 in the first-half alone, and went in at the break 1-0 ahead.
In the below image, we can see how Southend formed a 3-1 shape in the first-phase of build-up. Aldershot used their two #9’s in their 3-4-1-2 formation to press our wide centre-backs, and their #10 was tasked with both marking our #6 Cav Miley, as well as pressing our central centre-back Ollie Kensdale, whilst blocking the passing lane into Miley.
Despite Aldershot’s pressing structure, where they man-marked across the rest of the pitch, we still had a 4v3 numerical superiority in the first-phase, but were unable to make it count consistently enough to play through their high press with regularity.
Because we struggled to beat Aldershot’s press consistently from the start of the match, it would not only have reduced our confidence in our build-up method, but also increased Aldershot’s belief in their press. Because they were able to consistently turn possession over and create dangerous opportunities in transition, their front-three would have continued to press with aggression, as opposed to drop intensity if their belief in the press reduced, if it wasn’t working from the start of the match. Aldershot’s central-midfielders would also drop deeper if they didn’t have the confidence in their high press, as the ball would likely be coming towards their defence soon. This therefore would mean that Aldershot would sit deeper, making it easier for us to exert control on the match.
However, because Aldershot’s high press was so successful early on in the match, it allowed more of their players to commit to it, making it even more difficult for us to play through it. Whether we could play through Aldershot’s press consistently from the start of the match was therefore critical.
One way I would have liked to see us attempt to make our extra player in the first-phase count, was by dropping Miley deeper, using him as a situational centre-back next to Kensdale, by forming a back-four. This would mean that Aldershot’s #10 would now have to press both Kensdale and Miley, without being able to block the passing lane into one of them consistently. Ahead of this back-four would be a double-pivot of Noor Husin and Morton, who both have excellent ability during the first and second-phase of build-up. This would have created a 4-2-4 build-up shape.
However, it wasn’t just during Southend’s deep build-up where Aldershot were able to turn possession over and cause us problems. When we progressed play forwards and were attacking in Aldershot’s third of the pitch, we looked to form a 3-1-6 shape by pushing our two #8’s forwards into the last line of attack (as illustrated in the below image), as we usually do. This left us with a 3-1 rest-defence structure; made up of our back-three, with Miley sitting just ahead.
The issue with this structure is that it isolates our single #6 Miley in the middle of the pitch, and gives him a lot of space to defend (as we can see below) against an Aldershot side who leave three central players (their #10 and two #9’s) high up the pitch when they are defending deep in their own half.
This 3-1-6 shape is how we usually set-up once we’re into the final-third, and it usually works just fine. However, every opponent is different, and different tactics may work differently depending on your opponent’s strengths and weaknesses. Aldershot were able to exploit the openness of our 3-1-6 shape consistently.
Like I mentioned earlier, our first-half performance wasn’t all bad. We still created some chances and controlled the half fairly well, but we weren’t secure enough during deep build-up, and we were far too open during defensive transition.
Second-half
Aldershot player Rollin Menayese was sent off very early on in the second-half. Southend scored from the resulting free-kick, and took the lead shortly after.
This changed the dynamics of the match. All of a sudden Aldershot were down to 10 players and were behind, and Southend no longer had to be overly adventurous in search of a goal, which would have given Aldershot more dangerous opportunities in transition.
However, it was the substitution which saw Jack Wood replace Morton which I want to focus on, here. Wood was brought on mid-way through the second-half, and was used in the right-sided #8 position in our 3-5-2 formation. When we were out-of-possession, he defended on the right-side of midfield in our 5-3-2 formation, but when we were in-possession, he was afforded the freedom to drift out to the right touchline, where he helped us to form a 4-2-4 shape in the final-third.
This is very different to our usual 3-1-6 final-third shape, and there are a few knock-on effects that I want to mention.
First of all, having Bridge on the left-side and Wood on the right gave us equal threat from both sides of the pitch. One criticism of our wing-back system that I have is that we lack a right wing-back who is able to consistently create separation from his marker, which is one way that we could create space to break an opponent down when they are sitting deep in a low-block.
We get away with it on our left-side because we use Bridge as a left wing-back (who is really a winger), and he’s excellent at creating space for himself. However, we don’t have the same dynamic on our right-side, and this consequently makes us too reliant on our left-side to break opponents down when they are sitting deep, and the space is more congested.
In the absence of a true #10 profile in our squad, we therefore look to push both of our #8’s into the last line of attack to get players closer to our wing-backs, to help create separation. This consequently forms our 3-1-6 shape.
But because Wood can create separation more consistently than our right wing-back Jason Demetriou can, and he was now holding the width on the right-side of the pitch when we were into the final-third, we no longer had to push our right-sided #8 forwards into the last line of attack to help create separation. Whereas we would have had to if Demetriou or Gus Scott-Morriss were holding the width on the right-side.
This allowed us to attack with just a front-four; with good threat from both sides of the pitch, and two #9’s in the penalty area. And because we only had four players in the last line of attack, we could keep more players deeper when we were into the final-third, strengthening our rest-defence. In just the second-half, Aldershot accumulated an xG of just 0.27 compared to Southend’s incredible 3.80 xG, albeit with a player fewer for the most part.
Yes, Jack Wood’s introduction in the second-half was an offensive change, and his goal and assist will get the headlines. But the aforementioned tactical switch also made us much stronger during defensive transition, and helped to nullify one of Aldershot’s biggest strengths, and the aspect that made them so dangerous before half-time.
It also demonstrated another way that we can use Wood off of the bench. He can potentially be a very useful asset in moments where we’ll need to break an opponent down who are sitting deep in a low-block. But on this occasion, his inclusion not only gave us more threat in the final-third, but also made us stronger in defensive transition. It gave us a greater element of control against an opponent who are very dangerous in an open match.
Conclusion
To summarise, before half-time, Southend failed to consistently make the extra player in the first-phase of build-up count, and consequently struggled to play through Aldershot’s high press. This, together with our 3-1-6 final-third shape, allowed Aldershot to create some dangerous moments in transition.
In the second-half, Aldershot were reduced to 10 men, and Southend took the lead shortly after. This changed the dynamics of the match. The tactical change to bring on Jack Wood, and switch from our usual 3-1-6 final-third shape to a 4-2-4, made us much stronger in defensive transition, nullifying one of Aldershot’s biggest strengths, although we were also up against a side with a player fewer.
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